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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RAE ADAMSON, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, Docket No. 89068Q-DA 
-vs-
RANAE ADAMSON, Priority Classification 14b 
Defendant/Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT, Ranae Adamson, hereby submits the 
following Responding Brief in the above-captioned matter: 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals in 
this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(h) (1953, as 
amended). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from the final judgment and order entered 
by the trial court herein on or about August 28, 1989 in a 
domestic proceeding. No motions pursuant to Rules 50(a), 50(b), 
52(b) or 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were filed in this 
matter. The Notice of Appeal was filed on November 13, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
(1) Whether the lower court abused its discretion by 
denying husband's motion to terminate his alimony obligation. 
(2) Whether the lower court abused its discretion by 
finding no substantial change in circumstances to modify the 
issue of alimony. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
There are no case law authorities or statutory authorities 
believed by Respondent to be wholly dispositive of the issues on 
appeal herein. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE/STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent does not dispute the facts stated in Appellant's 
Statement of the Facts. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Appellant produced insufficient evidence to sustain a 
finding that Mrs. Adamson and Mr. McCray shared a common 
permanent residency and that they engaged in sexual contact 
evidencing a conjugal association. 
2. Appellant produced insufficient evidence to sustain a 
finding of substantial change of circumstances. 
3. Alimony should not terminate based on the equitable 
circumstances of the parties. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT 1: THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
SUSTAIN A FINDING OF CONSIDERATION. 
Both Utah law and the parties' Decree of Divorce state that 
alimony terminates upon a finding that the receiving party is 
cohabiting. Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(3), and paragraph 11, Decree 
of Divorce. The standard of review for a finding of cohabitation 
is that of abuse of discretion. English v. English, 565 P.2d 
409, 410 (Utah 1977). The controlling case for this issue is 
Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669 (Utah 1985). In Haddow, the court 
held that a finding of cohabitation should be based on the two 
elements of a common residency and sexual contact evidencing a 
conjugal association. The Haddow court also held that the 
element of shared living expenses, while not a requisite element 
of cohabitation, is helpful in determining cohabitation. 
Appellant failed to establish common residency, conjugal 
sexual contact or even shared living expenses sufficient to 
support a finding of cohabitation. 
a. Respondent and Mr. McCray did not share a principal 
domicile for more than a temporary or brief period of 
time. 
The Haddow court defined common residency as the sharing of 
a common abode that both parties consider their principal 
domicile for more than a temporary or brief period of time. 707 
P.2d at 672. In the present case, Appellant's evidence regarding 
any alleged cohabitation was sketchy at best and did not rise to 
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the level of cohabitation. Appellant produced evidence to show 
that Respondent lived in a motel room previously rented by Mr. 
McCray, that he had helped her with the rent from time to time 
and that he spent a "great deal of time" there. (T. 98-100). 
Mrs. Adamson, produced testimony that Mr. McCray's 
contribution to the rent consisted of his having painted part of 
the exterior of the motel in which Mrs. Adamson resided in 
exchange for an offset on her motel bill. Appellant's witness 
admitted that she had not seen Mr. McCray carry personal 
belongings in or out of the room. (T. 100-101). Mrs. Adamson 
testified that she and Mr. McCray were "just very good friends." 
(T. 113). She also testified that Mr. McCray helped her obtain 
the motel room because it was too cold to sleep outside and 
because she needed a place to receive her children for 
visitation. (T. 38, 114). She testified that Mr. McCray painted 
part of the exterior of the motel in exchange for a $600.00 
offset for three months of her rent and that Mr. McCray's 
permanent residence was in Draper. (T. 114). The record 
suggests that Mr. McCray's contribution in the form of painting 
services would probably not be long term because he had a stroke 
while painting. (T. 118). 
Mr. McCray testified that he lived in Draper with his mother 
and stepfather and that the Draper residence was his permanent 
home. (T. 133). He testified that even though he never finished 
the painting job, Mrs. Adamson still received a partial offset on 
her rent for a few months. (T. 134). 
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There was no evidence as to whether Mr. McCray had a key to 
the motel, whether he spent time there when Mrs. Adamson was not 
there, whether he could come and go as he pleased, whether he 
received mail there, whether he ever spent the night, or whether 
he was registered to vote in that district. In short, there was 
no evidence to show that the motel room was also Mr. McCrayfs 
permanent residence. Therefore, Appellant's argument that the 
lower court abused its discretion in failing to find cohabitation 
is unfounded. Therefore, this Court should sustain the lower 
court's ruling. 
b. Appellant presented no evidence to establish that 
Respondent engaged in a relatively permanent sexual 
relationship akin to that generally existing between 
husband and wife. 
The Haddow court held that a second element of cohabitation 
requires the receiving party to be in a sexual relationship 
evidencing a conjugal association. 707 P.2d at 672. 
Appellant presented testimony that Mr. McCray was 
Respondent's "boyfriend" and that he spent a good deal of time 
with her. (T. 98-100). Mr. McCray testified that he had dated 
Mrs. Adamson. (T. 134). Respondent testified that she and Mr. 
McCray were just good friends. However there was no evidence 
establishing that the two of them had any kind of sexual 
relationship, not to mention "a relatively permanent sexual 
relationship akin to that generally existing between husband and 
wife." 707 P.2d at 672. 
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Appellant never showed whether Mrs. Adamson and Mr, McCray 
had a sexual relationship, and if so, whether their relationship 
was sustained over a period of time so as to be conjugal in 
nature• 
Based on the evidence produced, the lower court had 
insufficient evidence to make a finding of cohabitation. 
Consequently, the court did not abuse its discretion when it did 
not find cohabitation. Therefore this Court should uphold the 
lower court's ruling regarding alimony. 
POINT 2. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
SUSTAIN A FINDING OF SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF 
CIRCUMSTANCES. 
Appellant argues that he should not be required to show a 
substantial change in circumstances to modify alimony because the 
decree stated that the award of alimony was subject to review. 
Appellant's argument reads more into the Decree than the 
lower court intended. In the same paragraph of the Decree quoted 
by Appellant, the court ordered that alimony continue "until 
defendant's remarriage or cohabitation, whichever first occurs, 
or until further order of this Court." (Decree of Divorce, 
paragraph 11). The record indicates that the court anticipated 
that Mrs. Adamson would find employment between the time of the 
trial and the time of the review hearing. In fact, the court 
appeared at times to pressure and even to badger Mrs. Adamson 
into a concerted job search: "The Court expects the Defendant to 
pursue all job training opportunities, that you contact Job 
Service, that you go through any counseling that they have there, 
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that you contact the Department of Vocational Rehabilitation, 
that you contact Social services." (T. 82). "I expect you to go 
to Vocational Rehabilitation. I expect you to go to Social 
Services." (T. 82-83). "I would expect that you make, at 
minimum and more, contact for employment as required by the 
Department of Employment Security. . . . Even if it's Wendy's or 
wherever it is, you frequently and commonly see Part-time Jobs or 
Help Needed." (T. 83). "I expect that you make some contact 
every week and that you be prepared to come back in six months 
with a complete diary of every contact, the date and what 
position you've applied to. I expect you to call Job Service and 
any other private employment agencies around." (T. 84). 
The court may have anticipated that a substantial change in 
circumstances should or would occur between the date of the trial 
and the date of the review hearing. Nevertheless, anticipating a 
change in circumstances is different than waiving the need to 
show such a change. Nothing in the record supports Appellant's 
claim that the court made such a waiver. Absent an explicit 
waiver, this Court cannot assume that such an important 
substantive and procedural requirement was waived. 
Even if Mrs. Adamson had found employment between the time 
of the divorce and the review hearing, that fact alone would not 
suffice to automatically terminate alimony absent a finding of 
change in circumstances. This Court found that it was 
"inappropriate to have alimony automatically terminate upon 
completion of education or attainment of full time employment. 
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Rather, the matter should be returned to the trial court to look 
at alimony in light of the completed education or full time 
employment as they apply to the English factors. Andersen v. 
Andersen, 757 P.2d 476, 478 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), see also 
Johnson v. Johnson, 103 Utah Adv. Rep. 22 (Utah Ct. App. Mar. 8, 
1989). 
Furthermore, the lower court did not have the discretion to 
terminate alimony after a long term marriage absent a finding 
that the receiving party would be able to support herself at a 
standard of living to which she was accustomed during the 
parties' marriage, or that the payor was no longer able to pay. 
Fullmer v. Fullmer, 761 P.2d 942, 951 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) see 
also Johnson v. Johnson, 103 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, (Utah Ct. App. 
March 8, 1989) . 
Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion by 
requiring Appellant to show a change in circumstances, nor did 
the court abuse its discretion by refusing to terminate alimony. 
Therefore, this Court should sustain the lower court's ruling 
regarding alimony. 
POINT 3. EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS SUPPORT AN 
AWARD OF ALIMONY. 
Appellant is not appealing the original award of alimony. 
Rather, Appellant is appealing the lower court's refusal to 
terminate alimony at a post divorce review hearing. Accordingly, 
Respondent's position is that this Court should not reach the 
issue of equitable considerations supporting alimony because 
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there was no showing of substantial and material change in 
circumstances since the time of the entry of the decree. 
However, the following argument is made in the event this 
Court does reach the issue of equitable considerations. 
Appellant, by his own testimony makes $26,067.00 a year. 
(T. 103). Mrs. Adamson's income is limited to her alimony 
payments and monthly state assistance consisting of $224.00 for 
housing assistance, $90.00 worth of food stamps and Medicaid 
assistance. (T. 127). 
One major purpose of alimony is to prevent the receiving 
spouse from becoming a public charge. English v. English, 565 
P.2d at 411. Terminating Respondent's alimony would render her 
totally dependent on the state. 
Appellant cites the fact that he has to pay a second 
mortgage on the house as a hardship factor for not paying 
alimony. However, that second mortgage was taken out either 
shortly before or after the separation. (T. 41 and 61). The 
$14,000.00 he received from the mortgage was used to pay for his 
truck and to pay off his student loan bills. (T. 61). He 
received value for both those debts because he currently has a 
masters degree and a social work license and he was awarded the 
truck in the divorce. (T. 62). 
On the other hand, Mrs. Adamson received no benefit from the 
$14,000.00 loan on the house. Nevertheless, Appellant is asking 
her to forego alimony because he chose to borrow money to cover 
his own personal expenses. 
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Even though Appellant may have overextended himself 
financially, Mrs. Adamson should not be penalized for his poor 
financial planning. This Court has made clear that alimony need 
not come from the income of the payor and that alimony could be 
paid out of inherited or gifted property or from marital 
property. Sampinos v. Sampinos, 750 P.2d 615, 618 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988), Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 302, 308 (Utah 1988), 
Proctor v. Proctor, 773 P.2d 1389 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Likewise, the lower court in this case did not abuse its 
discretion in setting alimony in the present case where the 
husband had a professional license, was well educated and had a 
work history demonstrating his ability to provide despite the 
fact that he may have been underemployed at the time of the 
trial. 
In short, it is equitable to require Appellant to honor his 
alimony obligation from whatsaver funds he has. To do otherwise 
would be to penalize Mrs. Adamson for the fact that Appellant 
took out an excessive personcil loan. 
Mrs. Adamson was in a long term marriage with Appellant in 
that she was married for 17 years. (T. 109). After the first 
year of marriage, she was not employed outside the home. (T. 20, 
109). She should be compensated for foregoing any personal and 
professional advancements and for devoting her productive years 
to raising their children as well as his child from a former 
marriage. Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69, 74-75 (Utah Ct. 
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App. 1988), Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1335 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988) (T. 28-30). 
In addition, Mrs. Adamson's special needs must be examined 
when determining alimony. In Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 
1371-72 (Utah 1988) the Supreme Court held that it is 
appropriate for the trial court to take into account whether 
physical or mental disabilities arising during the marriage, 
regardless of their cause, have made the receiving party's needs 
greater. 
Mrs. Adamson's health problems include severe abdominal 
pain, a duodenal ulcer, high blood pressure, severe depression, a 
urologic infection and foot problems. (T. 34-35 and 46). These 
problems are compounded by the fact that she is a middle-aged 
female and, except for a brief period, has been out of the labor 
market for over 17 years. It is unrealistic to expect her to 
achieve the marital standard of living. In a case similar to 
this one, this Court has held that it would be an abuse of 
discretion to terminate alimony for a woman in her mid-50s who 
possessed few marketable job skills and had little hope of 
retraining. Andersen v. Andersen, 757 P.2d 476 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). See also Hialey v. Hialey, 676 P.2d 379 (Utah 1983). 
Another equitable factor used in long term marriages is the 
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. "The ultimate 
test of the propriety of an alimony award is whether, given all 
these factors, the party receiving alimony will be able to 
support him- or.herself at the standard of living enjoyed during 
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the marriage*" Naranio v. Naranio, 751 P.2d 1144 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988), Schindler v. Schindler, 110 Utah Adv. Rep. 42 (Utah Ct. 
App. June 6, 1989). 
In short, even were this Court to reach the equitable 
considerations, such considerations would include the length of 
marriage, Mrs. Adamson's health problems, her lack of job 
training, Mr. Adamson's education, training, professional license 
and ability to earn. These considerations would support a 
generous award of alimony to Mrs. Adamson. Therefore, this Court 
should sustain the lower court's refusal to terminate alimony. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the lower court's decision should 
be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS Jj__ DAY OF April, 1990. 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
MARTHA PtflUCE 
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of Utah 
Legal Services, Inc., attorneys for Defendant/Respondent herein, 
and that I caused the foregoing Brief of Respondent to be served 
upon Defendant by hand-delivering four true and correct copies of 
the same to: 
MARY C. CORPORON 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
Suite 11 - Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
4 on the y day of April, 1990. 
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ADDENDUM 
Exhibit A (Decree of divorce, copy from Appellant's brief.) 
MARY C. CORPORON #734 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
Suite 1100 - Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 328-1162 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE"OF UTAH. 
RAE ADAMSON, 
Plaintiff, DECREE OF DIVORCE 
-vs- Civil No. D87-4654 
RANAE ADAMSON, Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
Defendant. 
THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER having come on for trial before 
the above-entitled court on Thursday, the 9th day of February, 
1989, the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Judge presiding; the 
plaintiff appearing in person and by and through counsel, Mary C. 
Corporon, and the defendant appearing in person and by and 
through counsel, Jeffrey C. Hunt, the Court having heard the 
sworn testimony of the parties and their witnesses and the 
arguments of counsel, and the Court having reviewed the file and 
the pleadings contained therein; based thereon, the Court being 
fully advised in the premises and more than 90 days having 
elapsed since the filing of the Complaint in this action, and the 
Court and having heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, now, therefor; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
RLTO DISTRICT COtWT 
Third Judicial District 
MAR 2 0 1989 
» S A _ L , W K E COUNTY 
By. MCjj 
0«putyCi#m 
1. Plaintiff is hereby granted a Decree of Divorce, 
dissolving the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between the 
parties, the same to become final and effective immediately upon 
being signed by the Judge and entered by the clerk in the 
register of actions. 
2. Plaintiff is hereby awarded the permanent care, custody 
and control of the minor children of the parties, Shandrae and 
Tracy• 
3. Defendant is hereby awarded visitation weekly with the 
minor children, with the exact times and dates to be arranged 
directly between the defendant and the parties' children, taking 
into consideration the Court's recommendation that this 
visitation occur either on a Saturday or on a Sunday, In 
addition, defendant is awarded visitation with the minor children 
on alternate state and federal holidays, on her birthday, and on 
the children's birthday, as she may arrange between herself and 
the children. Further, defendant is awarded reasonable and 
liberal telephone access with the minor children. The 
defendant's visitation with the children shall be unsupervised; 
however, in the event that the defendant should be intoxicated at 
the commencement of the visitation or become so during the course 
of the visitation, the children shall not be required to visit 
with the defendant on that occasion. 
4. Plaintiff is ordered to maintain health and accident 
insurance coverage for the benefit of the minor children of the 
parties, as it is available to him through his employment. 
5. Plaintiff, defendant and the parties' minor children, 
are hereby ordered to submit to counseling with a qualified 
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family therapist/ either through Salt Lake County Mental Health/ 
the Utah State Department of Social Services, or another 
qualified counselor or therapist, for purposes of resolving the 
conflict between the defendant and the minor children of the 
parties. 
6. Plaintiff is hereby awarded the truck, free and clear of 
any interest of the defendant and defendant is hereby awarded the 
Ford Granada, free and clear of any interest of the plaintiff. 
7. Plaintiff is ordered to pay and assume all debts and 
obligations incurred by the parties until the date of the divorce 
herein, including, specifically, any debt incurred by defendant 
for her living accommodations, 
8. The parties' previous division of their items of 
personal effects, jewelry, clothing and belongings, and household 
furnishings, fixtures and appliances is hereby confirmed in each 
and each party is awarded those items currently in his or her own 
possession, with the exception of the following items, which are 
hereby awarded to the defendant: the grandfather clock/ one set 
of bathroom linens, her sister's couch, a reasonable portion of 
the tableware, pots and pans and bedroom linens, and the casual 
table and chairs. 
9. Plaintiff is hereby awarded the permanent use and 
possession of the real property of the parties located at 4195 
South 1865 East in Salt Lake City, State of Utah, and all right, 
title and interest therein, including the right to any reserve 
account, free and clear of any interest of the defendant, subject 
to the first and second mortgage indebtedness owing thereon, 
which plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay and assume and hold 
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defendant harmless thereon* Defendant is hereby ordered to 
execute a Quit-Claim Deed, quit-claiming all interest she may 
i$r AJU*^^I£&L ?/#, coo ££*. 
have in said real property to the plaintiffJ Further, defendant 
is hereby awarded a non-interest bearing equitable lien on said 
real property, in the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00)# 
representing her one-half share of the equity in the real 
property, payable upon the first to occur of the following 
events: 
a. plaintiff's remarriage or cohabitation in the home 
with woman other than the defendant; 
b. the youngest child of the parties attaining the age 
of 18 years or graduating from high school in due course, 
whichever last occurs; 
c. the death of the plaintiff; 
d« the sale of the real property at plaintiff's 
election; 
e. plaintiff's ceasing to use said real property as 
his primary place of residence. 
10. Plaintiff's retirement plan through his employment with 
the State of Utah, is ordered to be divided between the parties, 
according to the Woodward formula, and a Qualified Domestic 
Relations Order shall issue from this Court. 
11. Plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay to defendant the sum 
of Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) per month, as and for alimony, 
commencing with the month of February 1989, and continuing until 
the death of the plaintiff or defendant, until defendant's 
remarriage or cohabitation, whichever first occurs, or until 
further order of this Court. This award of alimony is subject to 
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review by this Court on July 7, 1989 at 8:30 a.m., before the 
assigned judge. 
12. Defendant is hereby ordered to pursue all employment 
opportunities and all job training opportunities available to her 
as set forth in the Findings of Fact entered by this Court. 
Further, defendant is ordered to make a reasonable and concerted 
effort to obtain employment, including making contacts through 
Job Service, private employment agencies, and making a minimum of 
three applications for employment per week with prospective 
employers and is ordered to report her job search efforts to this 
Court at the hearing on July 7, 1989. 
13. Defendant is hereby ordered to pay to plaintiff the sum 
of Seventy-Five Dollars ($75.00) per month, per child, commencing 
with the month of February 1989 and continuing until such time as 
the minor children achieve the age of 18 years or graduate from 
high school in the normal course of their high school educations# 
whichever event occurs later. In any month when the defendant 
fails to make an actual monetary payment to plaintiff for child 
support," said child support shall be deducted from defendant's 
lien on the marital residence of the parties. 
In the event the defendant falls 30 or more days in arrears 
in her child support obligation, the plaintiff shall be entitled 
to mandatory income withholding relief, pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 62A-11-401, et. sea, (Supp. 1988). 
14. Each party is ordered to pay and assume his or her own 
court costs and attorney's fees. 
15. Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver all 
necessary documents to transfer the title and ownership of the 
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property of the parties pursuant to the Decree entered herein. 
DATED THIS 2A~clay of _ . 1989. 
BY THE COURT 
T 
KENNETH RIGTRUP 
District Court Judge 
6 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of 
Corporon & Williams, attorneys for the plaintiff herein, and that 
I caused the foregoing proposed Decree of Divorce to be served 
upon defendant by placing a true and correct copy of the same in 
an envelope addressed to: 
JEFFREY C. HUNT 
Attorney for Defendant 
225 South 200 East 
Suite 230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage pre-
paid thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah 
on the iA-y- day of February, 1989 • 
Secretary 
